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MEDICINE AND IDEOLOGY:
THE METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY
OF THE SENSATIONALISTS
Eighteenth-century European intellectuals generally assumed that they were living
in a time offundamental change. They were convinced that intellectual, material, and
social progress was possible, that it was occurring in at least some places, and that it
was bound to continue. The future must be more enlightened, more free, more
tolerant, and more prosperous than the past. Even when they risked imprisonment,
vilification, and exile because they disparaged established institutions and attitudes,
they did so believing that their notions would finally prevail. It is difficult for us to
recreate their optimism. To a large extent, our own cynicism about the present and
unease about the future are due to society's failure to realize the philosophes' vision
Earlier utopian aspirations had been rooted in a Christian ideal and looked towards
man's spiritual and moral nature for their realization. The forward-looking man in the
eighteenth century, however, believed that a better future would derive from the study
of the natural world and of man's place in it. Provided that the study was conducted
correctly, man would come to understand both his inner nature and his environment,
and be enabled thereby to live harmoniously in the world. In a profound sense, the
eighteenth-century savants believed in the virtue of a scientific, technological, and
hence materialistic future. These themes have long preoccupied students of the
Enlightenment and many persons have written about them at length. My primary
interest here is in the way in which this notion of possible and desirable progress
affected certain scientists and especially physicians and writers on physiology.
During the eighteenth century, there was a growing sense of the relative
backwardness of the life sciences, especially when their achievements were measured
against those ofphysics and chemistry. In the attempt to promote the advancement of
medicine, the state intervened, meanwhile offending the hide-bound Paris Medical
Faculty, long-time enemies of innovation who sensed their traditional power slipping
from them. A Societe Royale de Medecine was established by royal patent in 1776 as
an agency of the French state, to be consulted by members of the administration. Its
mandate was to address questions surrounding human and animal epidemics, sanitary
conditions, endemic and occupational diseases, surgical and anatomical subjects, and
the supervision oftherapeutic mineral waters. It quickly became a haven for the young
progressive spirits of French medicine so that, apart from some 162 associate
members, it attracted thousands of corresponding members from throughout the
kingdom. It was closed in 1793 as an institution ofthe Ancien Regime. Nevertheless,
its members were to contribute much to the medical world of post-revolutionary
France as well, bringing to fruition then many ofthe ideas which had been born before
the great iconoclasm.
Although the Societe Royale's perpetual secretary, Felix Vicq d'Azyr(1748-94) did
not survive the Revolution, many ofhis ideas found a home in the newly created ltcoles
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de Sante. Remembered especially as a comparative anatomist, he was also niuch pre-
occupied with questions ofscientific method and direction. He declared that medicine
needed to be incorporated into a larger "science ofman", one that concerned itselfnot
only with man's physical being but also with his psychological and social make-up.
The discussion ofjust such an integrated science was taken up widely after the Revolu-
tion, as we shall see later in this chapter.1 The Societe Royale's optimistic reforming
drive and its members' advocacy ofa larger "science ofman" persisted, finding a good
home in the Societe Medicale d'tmulation. Bichat, one of its founding members,
wrote the 'Preliminary discourse' to the first volume of the MWmoires de la Societ'e
Me'dicale d'Emulation, claiming that "the modest reunion ofseveral young friends of
the sciences scares some grave persons who appear to suspect there a secretly
hatched conspiracy against their antiquated principles and the ruinous state of their
doctrine." In a less than conciliatory vein, he said that he hoped that their detractors
would abandon envy for reason but, perhaps more importantly, that medicine would
be incorporated into a general "science ofman". Meanwhile, he invoked Hippocrates
as the eternal model to be emulated.2
The original membership list ofthe Soci6te d'tmulation included many ofthe most
famous physicians ofthe time, many ofthem former members ofthe Societe Royale.
If asked about the philosophy or methodology with which they approached their
work, most, if not all, would have claimed to be sensationalists and Newtonians. By
that, they would have meant that they undertook to apply to their own work the
methods that the great physicist had used in his. The imitation of physics
understandably preoccupied many savants, so that the intellectual and scientific world
of the eighteenth century was crowded with would-be Newtonians of every conceiv-
able discipline, including theology. Sensationalism was the psychological system, the
epistemological theory that, in the estimation of many, accompanied Newtonian
theory and provided the theoretical framework for progressive scientific procedure.
Sensationalist theory was rooted in the conviction that learning and knowledge
proceed from the five senses and not from some innate pool of ideas. As with many
ideas on biological subjects, Aristotle seems to have achieved priority by stating that
all knowledge derives from the senses. French sensationalists, however, including
most of the members of the Societe d'tmulation, traced their ideas on the subject to
the Abbe ttienne de Condillac in the 1750s, who, in turn, owed much to John Locke
(1632-1704). Locke discussed certain general precepts basic to scientific investigation,
which corresponded to Newtonian method and procedure. In 1801, Destutt de Tracy,
one of the foremost exponents of sensationalist philosophy, dubbed the system
"ideology", and its French proponents came to be generally known as "ideologues".
' Caroline C. Hannaway. 'The Societ6 Royale de M6decine and epidemics in the ancien regime', Bull.
Hist. Med., 1972, 46: 257-273. Charles Coulton Gillispie, Science andpolity in France at the end ofthe old
regime, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 194-226. Caroline C. Hannaway, Medicine, public welfare
and the state in eighteenth-century France: the Societe Royal de Medecine, Paris (1776-93), PhD thesis,
Johns Hopkins University, 1974; Ann Arbor, Mich., University Microfilms, 1976.
2Xavier Bichat, 'Discours pr6liminaire', Memoires de la Societe Medicale dEmulation, 1796, 7: i-xii.
For a discussion ofthe philosophy ofthe society and especially ofits members' views concerning the nature
of scientific medicine, see Sergio Moravia, 'Philosophie et m6decine en France a la fin du XVIII si6cle',
Studies on Voltaire andtheeighteenth century, 1972, 89: 1089-1151.
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By the end of the eighteenth century, "ideology" had become very influential in
France. The way in which physicians in particular interpreted ideology and adapted it
is our primary concern in this chapter. The way in which Bichat's work was influenced
by sensationalist precepts should become clear in succeeding chapters.
To early seventeenth-century philosophers and scientists, it seemed that philoso-
phical knowledge is attainable ifone proceeds from some original certainty. They pre-
sumed that one can correctly deduce all propositions from an initial axiom, so long as
it is sound and one proceeds rigorously. Descartes was the most notable spokesman
for that position. By the end ofthe century, this approach seemed much less credible.
Newton, for example, took care to affirm that to do his work, he had proceeded not
from axioms but from the data ofexperience and experiment. He elevated the status
of data so acquired to a supreme position in science. He also limited the scientists'
domain by contending that speculation about metaphysical and theological questions
was outside their competence: that is, Newton's approach to nature was inductive.
Whereas Descartes' statement ofcertainty, his "I think, therefore I am", had been his
starting-point, Newton's statement of the law of universal gravitation and his for-
mulations about optics were theend-point ofhis work.3
At the end ofthe seventeenth century, John Locke set out to create a science ofthe
human mind on the basis of Newton's principles. In the words ofJean d'Alembert in
the 'Preliminary discourse' to the Encyclopedie, "Locke reduced metaphysics to what
may be, in effect, the experimental physics of the soul".' To do so, he attempted to
trace the natural history of human ideas to their simplest form in the consciousness.
Locke contended that, lacking innate ideas, the mind is as "white paper, void of all
characters, without any ideas". All man's complex mental operations, his reason and
knowledge, are the product of the interaction of his sensations and of an innate
capacity for reflection. Our senses convey some distinct perceptions into the mind,
giving us our ideas ofsuch things as "yellow, white, heat, cold, hard, bitter, sweet, and
all those which we call sensible qualities". The reflective capacity of the mind or the
soul is a kind of internal sense by means of which we develop "perception, thinking,
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing and all the different actings of our
own minds". Acting together, these supply all the material necessary for thought.
"These two, I say, viz, external material things, as the objects of SENSATION and
the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me
3There are a number of good studies of Newtonianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Charles Coulton Gillispie's lively and elegant essay 'Science and the Enlightenment', The edge of
objectivity, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 151-202, remains the first work which ought to be con-
sulted on the topic. Some of the more recent important works are Robert E. Schofield, Mechanism and materialism. British natural philosophy in an age of reason, Princeton University Press, 1970; Arnold Thackray, Atoms and powers, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970; T. M. Brown, 'The
mechanical philosophy and the "Animal oeconomy"', Princeton University PhD thesis, 1970; Georges
Gusdorf, Lesprincipes de lapensee ausicle des lumieres, Paris, Payot, 1971, especially 'L'intelligibilite au
XVIII' siecle', pp. 151-289; and finally, the classic work of Ernst Cassirer, The philosophy of the
enlightenment, trans. by Fritz C. A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove, 7th ed., Princeton University Press,
1965, pp. 3-36. Gusdorfin particular has examined the importance ofthis English philosophy and its effects
upon French science.
4Jean La Rond d'Alembert, Preliminary discourse to the Encyclopedia oJ Diderot, trans. by Richard Schwab, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963.
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the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings."5
The Newtonian and Lockian systems took rather a long time to be assimilated in
France, for they collided for a time with a patriotically based allegiance to
Cartesianism. Indeed, the Cartesian Fontenelle dominated the powerful Academie des
Sciences for years, thus discouraging the diffusion of alternate views. Voltaire first
assisted the importation of English ideas into France when he cited Locke's views
approvingly in his widely read Lettre sur les anglais of 1734. He became a powerful
propagandist on Newton's behalf, arguing that Descartes had erred fundamentally
when he tried to create a physics without reference to experiment.6 Voltaire's
immensely successful Elments de la philosophie de Newton of 1738 was a
particularly decisive blow to a Cartesianism that had become something of an
albatross. The Lockianism that accompanied Newtonian theory seemed to provide
the very conceptual tools which the French needed at the time, and they grasped them
eagerly.
The Abbe' Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1800) was the first person to develop
Locke's theory. He eliminated the sensation-reflection dualism, contending that
reflection, like all other faculties, is subordinate to sensation, which is the body's only
source ofcognition and intellectual activity. It was a bold step insofar as it eliminated
any need for a hypothetical pool of innate ideas or for a divine origin for rational
thought. Condillac also propounded in detail a method of scientific investigation
known as "analysis", which was supposed to be the inductive method of Newton. In
time, scientists and philosophers came to see the analytic procedure as the indispens-
able element of all labour of the mind. The political, moral, and biological applica-
tions of Condillac's work were to preoccupy many French thinkers, scientists, and
politicians alike, until at least the post-revolutionary period. Its implications for
medicine and physiology were examined and systematized in the writings of Tracy,
Cabanis, and Pinel. Their work, in turn, strongly affected that of Bichat. The funda-
mental philosophy of Condillac, if not necessarily its details, was to be the reference
point for all those persons who, like the members ofthe Societe d'lmulation, wished
to study the whole man in his psycho-physiological complexity.
The "philosopher of the philosophes", as Condillac was known, was an unusual
man insofar as the Jesuits commended his work as much as did the materialists. A
circumspect man and an ordained priest, he expressed the most potentially radical
ideas in such a way that his lifelong loyalty to the Catholic faith never came into ques-
tion. lttienne Bonnot took the name Condillac from the Chateau de Condillac which
his father, a member of the petty nobility, had purchased in 1720. Condillac studied
theology at the Sorbonne. Reserved, cold, and humourless, he knew the sophisticated
salons of France, but did not shine in them. He became friends with Diderot and
Rousseau in Paris while they were still all literary unknowns.' In his Confevsions,
Rousseau related that it was Diderot who found a publisher for Condillac's first book,
I John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding, New York, Meridian, 1964, bk. II, ch. 1, pp.
89-98.
6 [Francois-Marie Arouet] Voltaire, 'Sur M. Locke', in Lettres sur les anglais, Cambridge University
Press, 193l, pp. 45-51.
I Isabel F. Knight, The geometric spirit; the Abbe de Condillac and the French enlightenment, New
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 1-16.
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his Essaisur l'origine des connaissances humaines of 1746. Meanwhile, he claimed for
himself the distinction of being the first person to have appreciated Condillac's
remarkable abilities.8
Condillac wrote the Essai sur l'origine, he claimed, to introduce Locke to the
French public. By observing how sensations and impressions combine to produce
knowledge and intelligence, he hoped to establish a philosophy of knowledge whose
principles and procedures would in themselves constitute an exact science.9 Contend-
ing that all knowledge derives from sensory perception and that all complex percep-
tions are compounds ofsimple ideas, he imagined a newborn child to be but a passive
recipient of a sudden multitude of confused sensations. In time, that which is first
experienced as merely a bombardment of light and colour, discomfort and pleasure,
motion and sound is developed into perception, consciousness, attention, memory,
imagination, and contemplation.10
In 1754, he supplemented that work with the Traite' des sensations, in which he
specifically denied the existence ofthe reflective capacity which Locke had conjectured
co-existed with sensation. He asserted that the psychic life and all its faculties and pas-
sions are developed from simple sensation alone.
To illustrate his thesis, Condillac described a hypothetical statue in which he could
juggle the number and combination ofthe five senses. He began his examination ofthe
process of learning by endowing it with smell, which he described as the least
intellectual ofall the senses. Since the statue, like man, is deprived ofinnate ideas, he
wrote, the statue can know nothing except what it learns from odours. He undertook
to show how, with smell, it would build up a knowledge ofitselfand ofthe world exter-
nal to it, how it would develop its passions and complex abstract notions, and even
how it would develop a notion of morality and of a deity." This use of a fictional
statue as a kind of thought experiment was, at the time, a fairly common device.
Buffon, for example, wishing to give an account of the development of human
thought, extrapolated Locke's notions and speculated about a kind of
"epistemological Adam". Confused initially by the bombardment of sensory
impulses, the hypothetical first man learned eventually to distinguish ideas and to
think. And in 1751,just three years beforethe appearance ofthe Traite'dessensations,
Diderot composed a Lettre sur les sourds et muets a l'usage de ceux qui entendent et
qui parlent, in which he suggested the possibility of reconstructing the formation of
I The petulant and testy Rousseau took credit for Condillac's first success: "The booksellers of Paris are
always arrogant and hard towards a new author, and metaphysics, which was not much in fashion at the
time, did not offer a very attractive subject. I spoke of Condillac and his work to Diderot, and introduced
them to each other. They were made to like each other and did so. Diderot induced Durant the bookseller to
accept the Abbe's manuscript, and this great metaphysician received for his first book, and that almost as a
favour, one hundred crowns and even that he would perhaps not have received but for me." Confessions of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. by Lester G. Crocker, New York, Washington Square Press, 1956, bk. 7, pp.
171-172.
9 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, 'Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines', in Oeuvrescomrpktes, 23
vols., Paris, Ch. Houel, 1798, vol. 1, pp. 1-16. See also the elegant work by Gerd Buchdahl, The image of
Newton and Locke on the AgeofReason, London, Sheed & Ward, 1961.
10 Knight, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 17-51. In this second chapter sheexamines the goals and the assump-
tions behind the Essai.
" See Condillac's 'Extrait raisonne', in 'Traite des sensations', Oeuvrescompktes, op. cit., note 9 above,
vol. 3, pp. 3-46.
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human thought. In his particular thought experiment, Diderot imagined five persons,
each in possession of a difference sense, relating their particular experiences and
perspectives.12
How does Condillac's statue, possessing only the sense of smell, come to learn
something of itself and of its world? A first odour strikes it and engages its attention.
It experiences pleasure or discomfort depending upon the nature ofthat odour. When
the statue encounters a second odour, its sensory capacity comes to be shared between
memory of the first odour and attention to the present one. With a succession of
odours, the statue learns to compare. If it attends to the odour of, say, a rose and a
carnation, it perceives that there is a difference between them, from which comparison
springsjudgement. Eventually, to compare and to judge become a habit. Our statue
was not surprised at the first sensation it encountered. It became capable of surprise
only when it passed suddenly from an accustomed state to a new one. Surprise aug-
ments the activity of the operations of the soul, a word which Condillac used in the
traditional sense to denote mind or consciousness.
As the soul compares past and present sensations, it develops a need which is felt as
a privation ofa desirable sensation. Our statue is capable ofdeveloping the faculty of
imagination, which is really a more vivid form of memory. By now, our statue has
developed a considerable number of faculties. Finally is born desire, which Condillac
considered to be a major moving force behind human mental development. He
described it as the faculties directing themselves to something for which one senses a
need. To experience desire, a statue must be able to judge the difference between an
existing state and a remembered one so as to be able to determine which is more
acceptable. Thus are born the passions such as joy, suffering, need, desire, love, and
hate. So far, however, the love is restricted to itself, for the statue is not yet aware of
an external world.13
At this stage, Condillac continued, the statue should be capable offorming abstract
ideas. Since the odour of each flower is particular, our statue will come to discern
number from a succession of odours. It will learn of coming and going, ofbeginning
and end, of past, present, and future.14 He wrote that, "if we consider that to recall,
compare, judge, discern, imagine, to be astonished, to have abstract ideas, and to have
number and duration, to know general truths and particular ones are nothing but
different ways of being attentive; that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to
fear and to want, are but different ways ofdesiring: and that finally to be attentive and
to desire are really but to sense; we conclude that sensation encompasses all the
faculties ofthe soul."'"1
A statue possessing only the sense ofhearing would develop similar faculties to the
statue which could but smell. A statue in possession of two senses would acquire the
same faculties extended further. The statue learns to perceive form with the eye only
because of that organ's unique structure. It would do so with the nose also if the
12 Gusdorf, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 232-249. Diderot's relationship with Condillac and with La Mettrie
is discussed by J. H. Brumfitt, The French enlightenment, London, Macmillan, 1972, pp. 99-132.
13 Condillac, op. cit., note I I above, pp. 56-95.
14 Ibid., pp. 96-120.
" Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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particles that produce the sense ofsmell travelled in straight lines, and ifthe nose were
so constructed as to accept their input in parallel lines. Neither sight, nor smell, nor
taste, nor hearing, however, will allow our statue to perceive that there exists a world
external to itself. A sense oftouch is essential to permit a living being to experience the
existence of its own material body and therefore to learn that there are bodies besides
itselfin the world.16
Condillac believed that even the religious experience has a sensory foundation. The
fact that the human race universally possesses the idea ofGod has long been the major
argument for the existence of innate ideas. But Condillac believed that the religious
sense comes once a human being learns that he is not alone in the world, and once he
begins to sense his dependence. A child believes for a while that what is pleasing exists
merely to please him and that which is disagreeable exists only to cause him pain. A
prayer is born of the desire for whatever is favourable to his senses. Thus it is that
primitive man, nearer to a childlike state than civilized man, addresses himself to the
sun to urge it to shine and to the trees to urge them to bear fruit; he treats agents of
pain and discomfort as disagreeable enemies to be appeased. And so the universe
becomes populated with visible and invisible beings. The sophisticated mind proceeds
from these first divinities to a more complex notion of first cause and thus to
montheism.1'
In the Traite' des sensations, Condillac went on to discuss the analytic method,
which derived from a sensationalist perception of the mind's functions. It has to do
with comprehending complexity by dissociating the component elements ofa thing so
as to study them separately. By sorting out its parts, one imposes an order on to
apparent chaos.'8 In his Logique of 1780, Condillac illustrated analysis with a country
view. Ifwe examine it merely as an attractive composite, we learn nothing substantial
about it. To do that we must decompose it so as to examine its parts:
If [nature] gave us the faculty of seeing a multitude of things at once, it also gave us the faculty of
looking at but one thing, that is to say, ofdirecting our eyes to one only; and it is this faculty which is the
result ofour organization, which gives us all the knowledge which we can acquire by the use ofsight ....
Thus one begins with the principal objects: one observes them in succession and compares them tojudge
their connexions. When by this means, one has their respective situation, one observes in succession all
those things in between them, or compares each of them with the nearest principal object and so deter-
mines their position.1'9
Thus it is that one comes to understand a countryside, universal gravitation, or the
functioning of the human body. A resynthesis completes the analytic process.'"We
decompose only in order to recompose; and when knowledge is acquired, things,
16 Ibid., pp. 124-272.
1' Ibid., pp. 388-391. The question of how man acquires a knowledge of God is dealt with at somewhat
greater length in Condillac's 'Traite des animaux', in Oeuvres compkies, op. cit., note 9 above, vol. 3, pp.
565-586.
I' Condillac, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 157-172. Analysis was described as the method appropriate to
scientific inquiry by Isaac Newton, who wrote in the Opticks as follows: "We may proceed from compounds
to ingrediants [sic] and from motion to the forces producing them, and in general from effects and their
causes and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument end in the most general. This is
the method of analysis; and the synthesis consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as
principles, and by then explaining the phenomena proceeding from them and proving the observations."
Quoted by Buchdahl, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 69-74.
'9 Condillac, 'Logique', in Oeuvrescompltes, op. cit., note 9 above, vol. 22, pp. 16-20.
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rather than being successive, have the same order in the mind that they have outside.
Our knowledge consists in this order."20 Condillac assumed that he had employedjust
such an analytic process, albeit imaginary, to demonstrate that all knowledge is
sensory. But as Knight has pointed out, he is open to the criticism that he violated his
own methodological principles because, instead ofcommencing a study with verifiable
facts, he used a fictitious statue-man.21
In his Logique, Condillac addressed the subject of language, which he described as
coinciding with analysis itself. Once again, he was taking up a theme popular in the
Enlightenment. Many persons speculated about the nature oforiginal language and its
connexion with human consciousness. In 1752, for example, Maupertuis addressed a
Lettre sur leprogres des sciences to Frederick II, proposing some experiments on, for
example, two or three abandoned children to isolate them complete from the external
world so as to observe their language development. A good example ofthe fruit born
ofCondillac's treatment ofthe subject is the achievement of Antoine Lavoisier, who
assiduously studied his work and subsequently produced a linguistic as well as a
methodological reform in chemistry. In the eighteenth century, of course, chemistry
was rudimentary, lending itself to analysis because it was concerned with complex
matter constructed from more elementary matter.22
Condillac acquired considerable prestige and influence in his own lifetime. His
philosophical achievement was honoured not only by scientists and philosophes, but
by various sections of government as well. From 1758 to 1767, Condillac was ins-
tructor to the Duke of Parma, nephew of Louis XV. Later, he turned down an
opportunity to teach the three sons of the dauphin. A Cours d'e'tudes which he com-
posed largely for the instruction of the Duke of Parma contained sections on
grammar, the art of writing, the art of reasoning, the art of thinking, and a general
history of man with a philosophy ofhistory. In 1769, he received a place in the exclu-
sive Academie Francaise. In 1777, the Polish government invited him to write an ele-
mentary logic for use in their public schools. This was, in fact, the source of his
Logique, an outline of his ideological methods described for purposes of public ins-
truction. It was treated as a model for education in French schools until shortly after
the Revolution.
One of the first persons to become involved with Condillac's ideas and to publicize
them was Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717-83), an accomplished mathematician and
physicist. He was one of the first Frenchmen to delve into the implications of
Newtonian science and philosophy, and his Treatise on dynamics of 1744 is generally
taken to be a landmark in Newtonian mechanics. He accepted, more or less as given,
the sensationalist point ofview which, for many, accompanied Newtonianism. It was
d'Alembert who composed the "manifesto of the French Enlightenment" and its
"discourse on method", the Preliminary discourse to the first volume of the
Encyclopedie.23
20 Ibid., pp. 12-22.
21 Knight analyses Condillac's 'Traite des sensations' in op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 52-78.
22Gusdorf, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 232-249. Condillac's work and the question of language and
scientific nomenclature arediscussed by Moravia, op. cit., note 2 above.
23 Schwab, 'Translator's introduction', Preliminarydiscourse, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. ix-xxxi.
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Close friends since the 1740s, d'Alembert and Condillac must have influenced one
another's notions ofscientific method and epistemology. Indeed, Condillac's influence
on the Preliminary discourse is unmistakable. At the beginning ofthe work, d'Alem-
bert asserted that "All our direct knowledge can be reduced to what we receive
through our senses; whence it follows that we owe all our ideas to our sensations." He
described how our sensations teach us, first, the fact ofour existence and then, that of
external objects in which he included our bodies. Differing somewhat from Condillac,
however, d'Alembert described three faculties of the mind that react with the sensa-
tions - memory, which is the recalling of sensations; reason, which involves compar-
ing; and imagination, which is the creation ofnew ideas.
D'Alembert also described the process of analysis, which he assumed produced
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mathematics and physics.?4 He discussed the
process again in the article 'Analytique', which hecomposed for the first volume ofthe
Encyclopedie. He wrote, in imitation ofNewton, that the essence ofscientific method
is the path by means ofwhich "one may proceed from composite substances to their ele-
ments, from motions to the forces which produce them, and in general, from effects to
their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, up to the point where
one arrives to that which is the greatest of all."25 Through the Encyclopedie, Con-
dillac's basic philosophy reached what was probably the widest audience possible at
the time.
One of the first physicians to pay special attention to Condillac's texts was Felix
Vicq d'Azyr(I1748-94), who came to Paris from Normandy to study medicine in 1765.
One ofthose enviable persons who is able to embrace a wide range of subjects and to
enrich one by borrowing from another, he contributed substantially to contemporary
discussions of anatomy, physiology, medical theory, and hygiene. Vicq d'Azyr tried
consciously and consistently to apply Condillac's notions to his work and teaching.
With analytical principles in mind, he developed the discipline of comparative
anatomy by deliberately studying organs and functions in isolation, and then linking
together as units.26 As permanent secretary ofthe Societe Royale de la Medecine, he
helped to make the most innovative French physicians conscious ofsensationalist and
analytic principles and of their potential application to a reform of medical teaching
and practice.
On behalf of the Societe Royale, Vicq d'Azyr presented certain reflections on
medical teaching to the French National Assembly in 1790. The document was a
powerful indictment of a profession which he described as populated with ignorant
physicians and charlatans. In the entire country, he charged, there was no place where
the principles of the healing art were adequately taught. Entry into medical schools
was too easy, and once inside, the student received insufficient instruction and was
24d'Alembert, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 6-1 1.
25d'Alembert, 'Analytique', in Denis Diderot,Encyclop&die, 35 vols., Paris, 1751-80, vol. I, pp. 403-404.
26 Vicq d'Azyr's work has not, thus far, been extensively studied. The most useful biography I have found
is Jacques Moreau's 'Discours sur la vie et les ouvrages de Vicq d'Azyr', Oeuvres de Vicq d'Azyr, 6 vols.,
Paris, L. Duprat-Duverter, 1805, vol. 1, pp. 1-88. Vicq d'Azyr's general role in eighteenth-century French
medicine is discussed by Moravia, op. cit., note 2 above. Moravia deals with Vicq d'Azyr's ideological con-
victions, his link to the Societe Medicale d'Emulation, and his wish to see the medical profession devclop
autonomy.
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subjected to inadequate examination. Medical theory in general, unable to free itself
from its dependence upon other sciences, was unable to develop its own instruments,
techniques, and laws." Vicq d'Azyr argued that medicine ought to define itself much
more broadly, going beyond the mere examination of bodily parts and functions. Its
preoccupations should also include psychology and even human social organization
and its institutions.28 Vicq d'Azyr placed man at the summit ofa chain ofliving beings
and invited the philosopher, savant, artist, and literary man tojoin the physician and
naturalist in studying him.29 Some ofhis notions were presented to the Revolutionary
convention by Antoine Fourcroy shortly after Vicq d'Azyr's death. Thus he con-
tributed towards the reformed education system which produced the ltcoles de Sante
in 1795.
Vicq d'Azyr's outspoken demand for autonomy and reform was not a new theme. It
was implicit in the Montpellier physicians' reaction to iatromechanism and to the
subordinate status of life sciences that it implied. Montpellier had considerably
influenced Parisian intellectual life through such persons as Bordeu, Barthez, and
Fouquet.30 By the time Vicq d'Azyr was writing, physiology had developed a language
appropriate to its concerns. Addressing itself to sensibility and contractility, it no
longer had to adopt an imagery of mechanics and of forces belonging to physics. It
had a basis upon which to develop a mature and separate discipline. The vision ofVicq
d'Azyr and the sensationalists incorporated more than physiological theory, however.
It also had to do with medical practice, hygiene, and psychology, such that it was a
broadly defined healing art secure in its status as an autonomous science and confident
in its premisses. The scientific method of analysis and the sensationalist psychology
upon which it was based had much to do, therefore, with the post-revolutionary
changes in medical teaching and practice.
One salon in particular, that of Madame Helvetius at Auteuil near Paris, became
an important centre for the elaboration of Condillac's principles. Before the Revolu-
tion, Madame Helvetius entertained such famous men as d'Holbach, Diderot,
d'Alembert, Volney, Lavoisier, and the Americans, Jefferson and Franklin. Cabanis and
Tracy, who belonged to a kind ofthird generation ofphilosophes, had certain oftheir
ideas shaped by that company. For a time, the ideologues in general were considered
to belong to an exclusive company of intellectuals who were able to contribute sub-
stantially to government and reform. They had tended to welcome the French Revolu-
tion initially, being generally interested in questions ofpolitics, education, and so on.
They generally agreed upon the necessity to create rational and free institutions to
27 Felix Vicq d'Azyr, 'Reflexions sur les abus dans l'enseignement et l'exercise de la medecine', Oeuvres,
op. cit., note 26 above, vol. 5, pp. 57-67. For a discussion ofthe general situation ofthe medical profession
and the context in which Vicq d'Azyr's proposals were made, see Paul Delauney, Le monde medical
Parisien au dix-huitiemesikcle, 2nd ed., Paris, Jules Rousset, 1906, especially pp. 21-27. Michel Foucault,
The birth ofthe clinic, trans. by A. M. Sheridan, London, Tavistock, 1973, pp. 64-87, discusses the theme
ofa new medicine based upon the clinic and of Vicq d'Azyr's notion ofhospital teaching as the solution to
many ofits problems.
28 Vicq d'Azyr, 'Idee gen6rale de la m6decine et de ses differentes parties', Oeuvres, op. cit., note 26
above, vol. 5, pp. 44-57.
29Vicq d'Azyr, 'Exposition descaract6res qui distinguent les corps vivants', ibid., vol. 4, pp. 229-312.
30 For a later statement of that position it is interesting to read Alexis Alquie, Pr&'is de la doctrine
medicale del'Ecole de Montpellier, 4th ed., Montpellier, Freres Ricard, 1846, especially pp. 27-102.
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replace those of the rigid and anachronistic pre-revolutionary regime. In the 1790s,
much was to change, and Auteuil became a refuge for certain liberal intellectuals who
were repelled by the Terror and by the excesses of radical politics in general. And
again, after 1801, it sheltered ideologues rejected by Napoleon and a newly
reconstituted French establishment.
The systems of Locke and Condillac easily lent themselves to the liberal political
philosophy with which the ideologues became identified. According to Condillac, as
we have seen, much of an animal's development derives from its perception of sensa-
tions as being either pleasurable or uncomfortable, and from its striving after the one
and the avoidance ofthe other. The pleasure-pain principle was extrapolated by some
into political notions having to do with liberty and the basis ofjustice. Ifone is able to
exercise one's will in conformity with a desire, one presumably possesses at least some
measure of freedom. The pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain can be ajnd
often were, in the eighteenth century, made the sole guides of moraljudgement. Such
an approach, presumably unencumbered by tradition, superstition, and habit, was
judged to be more "natural" and hence closer to some kind of pristine human state.
The intention of the ideologues who derived their political assumptions from psy-
chological ones was to permit Frenchmen to create a moral and social order based
upon utilitarian and materialistic notions of man and society. Education, they said,
should be directed to that end and to the destruction ofsuperstition and prejudice by
the teaching of science. After the fall of Robespierre, many ideologues functioned as
enthusiastic legislators and reformers of French institutions until 1801. That year, the
motto "Dieu et l'Empereur" signalled the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to undisputed
power in France. As the motto suggested, a purely secular morality and the teachings
of social utility were no longer to be countenanced.3' Napoleon turned against his
former friends and supporters and even had them suspended from the Institute,
thereby forcing them to form their centre ofintellectual opposition at Auteuil.
One of the habitues of Auteuil as well as a refugee there after 1801 was Antoine-
Louis-Claude, Comte Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), a philosopher and politician.
Among his contemporaries, he came to be acknowledged as one ofthe most important
of all the exponents of sensationalist philosophy. Under threat of the guillotine,
Destutt de Tracy studied the sciences in Carmes prison, where he was thrown on
charges of incisivism and aristocracy. His fellow-inmate Lavoisier introduced him to
the works of Locke and Condillac. Named a senator in 1799 for his support of
Napoleon's coup d'e'tat, he went into a kind of exile in Auteuil in 1801, when he had
time to put thoughts to paper.
Destutt de Tracy dreamed of creating an entire philosophical system that would
include politics, economics, morals, ethics, language, and the sciences. As it was
initially conceived, it was the first major effort to produce a theory of human psy-
chology and epistemology tied to a study ofthe economic, social, and political forms
of society. He labelled the all-embracing new science "ideology". But he abandoned
31 Charles Hunter Van Duzer, Contributions of the ideologues to French revolutionary thought,
Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935, p. 14. For a discussion ofthe ideologues' education
theories, see L. Pearce Williams, 'Science, education and the French Revolution', Isis, 1953, 44: 311-330.
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the lements d'ideologie when his friend Cabanis died, after completing sections on
Grammairegen'rale, Logique, and Traite'de volonte'.
Destutt de Tracy claimed to be addressing young people "to make you see in detail
what happens when you think, speak and reason." With the sort of purportedly
rational zeal that sometimes afflicts persons preoccupied with science, he began by
warning his readers to beware of those philosophers, "amiable enchanters but very
dangerous seducers," who, like poets, reason according to their imagination and not
after the facts.32 In asking the broad question, "What is thought?", Destutt de Tracy
arrived at a system that differed somewhat from those of Locke and Condillac.
Although he agreed that the first faculty ofthe body is sensation, he did not believe it
to be the only one. Our thoughts are composed ofthe interaction of four elementary
faculties. To sensation (I feel a burn) he added memory (it occurred yesterday);judge-
ment (a body burned me); and will (I desired. to remove myself from that body).
Ingenious though it was, Condillac's imaginary statue was deemed unsuitable for
explaining how a human being learns, simply because it lacked internal organs, receiv-
ing all its impressions from the exterior ofthe body. A living body, on the other hand,
also experiences sensations ofcolic, nausea, hunger, pleasure, and pain."
Like Condillac, Destutt de Tracy set out to examine rationally how one learns,
composing complex ideas from simple ones.34 His approach reminds one often ofthat
of his mentor. A significant addition to the development of sensationalism at the
hands of Destutt de Tracy is an extended discussion of habit, which he considered to
be basic to all learning. It is by means of habit that one learns to dance, to play a
musical instrument, to read, and so on. It affects even memory and judgement. The
more often something is experienced, the less one must consciously decompose its ele-
ments, and the less acutely one feels the sensations it produces.3" Again like Condillac,
Destutt de Tracy considered language to be the primary and even the ultimate
intellectual tool. It is the mechanism for all operations of thought, an analytical tool
guiding human intelligence and permitting the expression ofideas.36
The ideologues' preoccupation with language can be illustrated from the work of
Charles-Louis Dumas of Montpellier, who, in 1797, published his Systeime
me'thodique de nomenclature et classification des corps humains. He hoped to suggest
how parts of the body might be named, preferably on the basis of their points of
muscle attachment, so as to convey maximum information. Complicated and
unwieldly, the result remained deservedly obscure. His more coherent and influential
Principes de physiologie of 1801 opened with a statement on sensation and analysis,
the 'General principles for the good philosophical method in the study ofthe sciences'.
Although it reveals Condillac's almost inevitable influence, it also shows us that
Dumas reverted to Locke's notions that ideas are the products ofexternal sensations
32 Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, 'Ideologie proprement dite', Elemenls d'idWologie, 3rd ed.,
Paris, Courcier, 1817, p. 19.
33 Ibid., pp. 22-39.
34 Ibid., pp. 78-92.
35 Ibid., pp. 274-294.
36 Ibid., pp. 309-323. For more material on Tracy, see Francois Picavet, Les ideologues, Paris, Felix
Alcan, 1891; Van Duzer, op. cit., note 31 above; and especially Emmett Kennedy, Destult de Tracy and
the origins ofideology, Mem. Amer. Phil. Soc., 1978, no. 129.
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reacting with internal reflection."
The philosophes largely scorned the European Middle Ages and tolerated the
Renaissance only slightly better. Peter Gay has shown how deep was their veneration,
however, for the pre-Christian civilizations of Greece and Rome, which most ofthem
judged to have been genuinely progressive because they were free of religious
superstition.33 Among those ideologues who were physicians, there was a particular
flowering of interest in Hippocratic medicine. Because he lived a very long time ago
and in a somewhat different scientific ethos, Hippocrates could be all things to all
men. For centuries, he had been every physician's symbol of the ideal physician, as
much as the interpretation of that ideal altered. He was important for the French
vitalists, the members ofthe Societed'tmulation, and the ideologues in theeighteenth
century because they took his work to be a model of good method. They frequently
affirmed that Hippocrates was a great physician because he worked basically in the
way his modern successors were advocating. He observed, he analysed, and he tried to
understand an illness not merely in terms of its individual symptoms but in terms of
the whole man and ofthe circumstances in which he found himself. To account for the
state of health and for human temperament, for example, Hippocrates took serious
account of such variables as age, sex, temperament, regimen, profession, and
climate.39
Jean-Georges Cabanis (1757-1808), the ideologue physician par excellence, fre-
quently referred to Hippocrates in his medical writings. At the age of ten, Cabanis
attended the College de Brives, where he was taught by a man who tried consciously to
apply the analytic method to the study oflanguages and grammar. After a disappoint-
ing flirtation with the Greek literary classics, Cabanis turned to medicine, qualifying
as a physician at Rheims in 1784. As early as 1778, he began to attend the salon at
Auteuil, where he became friends with Destutt de Tracy. Between 1785 and 1789, he
lived there as a kind ofadopted son of Madame Helvetius, and he inherited her home
in 1800.40
He demonstrates well the relationship between sensationalism, medicine, and the
science of man. His first major work, Degre' de la certitude de la medecine, 1788,
examined the question of what is good scientific method in medicine. To acquire
knowledge about life, death, and illness, he argued, it is sufficient to observe and to
examine sensible phenomena and their interconnexion. While it is the observer's duty
to study carefully events and their connexions, he must remember that the principles
of life, the ultimate nature and cause ofdisease, and the nature ofhealing substances
are all secrets beyond the capacity of researchers. One must remain within the limits
ofsensory phenomena. That was not to deny the possibility ofmedicine's becoming a
rigorous science. It was, however, to deny the validity of systems and of a priori
principles.
37 Charles Louis Dumas, Principes dephysiologie, 4 vols., Paris, Deterville, 1800-04, vol. I, pp. 8-9.
38This is the theme ofPeter Gay's The Enlightenment, an interpretation, New York, Vintage, 1968.
39 Moravia, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 1098-1105.
40 Biographical details are available in Claude Lehec's 'Biographie', Oeuvresphilosophiques de P. J. G.
Cabanis, ed. by Claude Lehec and Jean Cazeneuve, 2 vols., Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1956, vol. 1, pp.
v-xxi; and in Picavet, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 176-224.
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Cabanis' thoughts on the subject of analysis or scientific method as it applied to
medicine were expounded further in his Coup d'oeil sur les re'volutions el sur la
reforme de la me'decine, 1804. The years between its writing and that ofthe Certitude
de la medecine were largely taken up with politics. A firm believer in liberal reform,
Cabanis joined public life after the execution of Robespierre. He sat on the Hospital
Commission after the re-establishment of medical education; he was appointed
Professor of Hygiene and Clinical Medicine in Paris; and he became a member ofthe
National Institute and was made a representative on the Council of Five Hundred.
Like Destutt de Tracy, he was named a senator as a reward for his support of
Napoleon's coup d'e'tat in 1799. In 1804, however, he was deprived of membership in
the National Institute and the Senate, and he retired to Auteuil to write.
In Re'volutions et reforme, Cabanis discussed h;s ambiguous feelings toward the
profession of medicine. It was currently like a traveller hindered with excess baggage,
which represented the great weight of material collected without judgement or
discrimination. In spite of medicine's dismal past, however, its potential was enor-
mous, if men would but undertake to be governed by reason.41 The Greeks, of whom
Cabanis wrote in superlatives, were taken to be an appropriate model. Hippocrates,
he alleged, had delivered medicine from false systems and had created new methods
for it. The analytic method is basically Hippocratic procedure recently rediscovered.42
Francis Bacon was the first modern man to acknowledge the supreme importance of
sensory evidence. Thereafter, many persons including Hobbes, Locke, Bonnet, and
especially Condillac had progressively refined the process of philosophical analysis,
making it surer and simpler.43
Cabanis' description of analysis was much like that offered by Dumas in his
Principes dephysiologie. Both men were influenced by the Baconian inductive method,
which they fused on to sensationalism. Cabanis distinguished four basic types of
analysis. An analysis ofdescription examines a body's size, shape, form, and the rela-
tion of the parts. An analysis ofdecomposition or recomposition is involved, for
example, in trying to discover the workings of a watch by taking it apart and
reassembling it. This was presumably the method that Lavoisier and Bichat employed
to do their chemical work and tissue work respectively. A historic analysis is an
examination ofhow phenomena succeed one another. It is suitable for understanding
plant growth, muscular action, or the progress of an illness. It was, in fact,
Hippocrates' method for observing disease. Finally, the analysis of deduction
considers the ideas we receive from objects rather more than the mere objects
themselves. With it, one can compare ideas, determine their interconnexions and
thereby deduce a new series oftruths. By a series oftransformations, one can arrive at
some primary ideas that cannot be verified by experiment. For example, thededuction
that the sun will rise tomorrow belongs in this category. So does the analysis ofdrugs
and the determination of their effectiveness." Such was Cabanis' faith in sound
41 Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, Coup d'oeil sur les revolutions et sur la reJorme de la medecine, Paris,
Crapart, Caille et Ravier, 1804, pp. 3-35.
42 Ibid., pp. 72-97. See also Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, Rapports duphysique et du moraldeIhomme,
2 vols., Paris, Bechet Jeune, 1824,vol. 1, pp. 1 1-36.
43 Cabanis, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 145-194.
Ibid., pp. 270-313.
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method that he believed that twenty-five or thirty years ofreorganizing and reclassify-
ing the facts would suffice to verify all observations except perhaps those having to do
with epidemics.
Cabanis' principal work was his Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme,
which appeared in 1805. It dealt with questions ofhuman consciousness and learning
and has led people to describe the author as a precursor or even the founder of psy-
chosomatic medicine.45 Whether or not one accepts so enthusiastic an evaluation, the
work was Cabanis' particular contribution to the goal of a unified science of man.
Human nature, he claimed, must be studied as a composite of man's physical and
moral make-up. Medical science must, henceforth, take into account man's physical,
cultural, and social milieu, as well as the condition ofhis physical body. Environment
invariably affects the condition ofa body, the type ofillness to which it is subject, and
its reactions to medication and other treatment. To be totally effective, the physician
must also be a moralist - we might say a psychologist - who seeks to perfect the
private life, a legislator who tries to correct a national or social situation, and a healer
of the various problems that affect man's wellbeing in general. Cabanis' political
involvement, therefore, was entirely consistent with medical practice.
The notions expounded in Du physique et moral were grounded in sensationalism.
Life, Cabanis wrote, consists in a series of movements or activities executed in
response to the impressions received by various organs. Without our senses, we in
effect would not exist as living beings, for to live is to feel or to sense.'6 Indeed,
Cabanis described birth as not merely a change but a completely new life for the
animal. A foetus possesses only the sense oftouch, because that alone can be ofsome
small use to it. Only when it leaves the womb, however, does it begin to develop sight,
taste, smell, and hearing, and thus to live its full sensory life.
Like Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis found Condillac's statue-man to be too limited to
describe learning adequately. Although the effects of sensations in the animal are
primary, they are modified by such variables as age, temperament, health, climate,
and regimen. Some of these factors are external in origin, while others are purely
internal. Habitual ideas and feelings are often altered by factors that have nothing to
do with external sensations. Puberty provides us with perhaps the best example of a
major series ofsuch changes. Perhaps less dramatically, even the digestive organs, the
heart, and the great vessels can have profound effects upon us. In spite ofhis affirma-
tions of loyalty to Condillac and to Locke, Cabanis found it necessary to reintroduce
at least some innate principles into the body. It is necessary, he believed, to postulate
an instinctive life that coexists with the sensory life to account for certain unlearned
visceral phenomena. This innate life was not, however, capable ofaccounting for such
phenomena as the human religious sense. Indeed, according to Cabanis, it is
absolutely unintelligent, only touching the conscious mind at the level of strong emo-
tions and responses. Unlike Condillac's theory, it can account for sexual instincts, a
maternal sense, and for such instinctive activity as nest-building among birds, as well
41 Pierre Astruc, 'Les ides de Cabanis sur la m6decine',Leprogre'smMdicale, 1956, 84: 372-374.
46Cabanis, op. cit., note42 above, vol. 1, pp. 3642.
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as for all other activities which have nothing to do with habit orjudgement.4'
The reader will recognize here a variant on Grimaud's and Bichat's separation ofan
animal's life into external and internal categories. Whether consciously or not,
Cabanis was here echoing Bichat's contention, developed some four years earlier in La
vie et la mort, that birth is the beginning of an external life which derives from con-
scious sensations. In the shelter of the womb, Bichat said, only internal or organic
functions can exist. In that condition, an animal's consciousness and intelligence
cannot develop, so that a foetus is little more than a kind ofa plant.4"
Cabanis' notions of sensationalism and psychology had important social implica-
tions. As long as one assumes that all human beings receive the same impressions
from the external world through sensory organs which behave in a consistent way, one
*may believe in the possibility of achieving human equality. Its possibility, in fact,
seems to be implied in Condillac's viewpoint. According to Cabanis, however, people
vary widely not only as a result oftheir environment, but also because ofsuch factors
as age, sex, state of health, and so on. Indeed, they are born neither physiologically,
temperamentally, nor intellectually equal, making it impossible for them to learn and
develop in similar ways.49
This preoccupation with man as a complex amalgam of mind and body shaped by
physical, psychological, and environmental factors received considerable attention in
the eighteenth century. Hippocrates had probably pointed the way to this type of
study in On airs, waters andplaces, an analysis ofthe effects ofweather, climate, the
seasons, and the landscape on human temperament and health. 0 In his Esprit des lois,
Montesquieu was searching for the laws that govern human organization. He observed
that the general character of people differs substantially in various climates. The
second volume of Barthez' klements de la science de l'homme included a study of
temperaments and an analysis of the effect of social and geographical factors on the
development ofman's physical and moral natures. He contended that climate, terrain,
altitude, distance from the sea, winds, and the qualities of the sun affect human
personality and behaviour. Even political factors alter the vital principle and conse-
quently man's physical, mental, and moral make-up. Such studies were entirely con-
sistent with the striving for an autonomous science of man to which the Societe
47 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 91-121; vol. 2, pp. 319-328; Jean Cazeneuve, 'Philosophie de Cabanis', Oeuvres
philosophiques, op. cit., note 40 above, vol. 1, pp. xxv-xxix; Picavet, op. cit., note 36 above, pp. 259-263.
4"Jean Charles Grimaud, Memoire sur la nutrition, Montpellier, Jean Martel, 1787, pp. 19-40; C'ours
complet de physiologie, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Paris, Egron, Gabon, Crochard, I'Heureux, Bechet et Lanthois,
1824, vol. 1, pp. 38-39; Xavier Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, Paris, Brosson,
Gabon, 1800, Art. 1, 1-9.
49This point was made by Frank E. Manuel, 'From equality to organicism', J. Hist. Ideas, 1956, 17:
54-69. The difference between the notions of Condillac and ofCabanis led Aram Vartanian in the critical
edition of la Mettrie's L'homme machine, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 125-129, to argue
strenuously that, unlike Tracy, Cabanis was an opponent of Condillac's system. I believe that, though
Cabanis moved a considerable distance from the older system, he did not break with it. Significantly, he
remained in substantial agreement about the primary role of the sensations in the intellectual life, and he
was an exponent of the system of analysis. Beyond this, however, the question is merely a quibble over
categories.
50'Trait6 des airs, des eaux et des lieux', in Oeuvres completes d'Hippocrate, ed. and trans. by E. Littre,
10 vols., Paris, Bailliere, 1840, vol. 2, pp. 12-93. Eng. trans. in G. E. R. Lloyd (editor), Hippocratic
writings, Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books, 1978, pp. 148-169.
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Royale de Medecine and the Societed'tmulation had aspired. There was a commonly
held conviction that morality, religion, the formation ofsocieties, and so on would in
time be shown to be on a par with physical laws and hence amenable to analysis.5'
One of the most famous quotations in the history of medicine is that in which
Cabanis described the brain as "a particular organ especially destined to produce
[thought]; just as the stomach and the intestines operate the digestion; the liver filters
the bile; the parotids and the maxillary and sublingual glands prepare the salivary
juices." Sensory impressions entering the brain, he continued, induce it to action just
as the sensation of food entering the stomach excites more abundant secretions of
gastric juice. "The proper function of the one is to perceive each particular impres-
sion, to attach signs to it, to combine different impressions, to make comparisons
between them, to take judgements and resolutions from them, just as the function of
the other is to act on nutritive substances."52 His more pious critics were outraged at
what appeared to be an atheistic point ofview. During the Bourbon Restoration, such
statements provided a convenient excuse to dismiss and discredit Cabanis' work,
causing it to fade into relative obscurity. It is incorrect, however, to accept so trivial
and superficial an interpretation of Cabanis' words and thereby to dismiss him as a
crude mechanist.
He was a materialist who, like La Mettrie and Diderot, proceeded from deeply
rooted vitalist convictions. He shared their monist assumptions whereby the universe
is a material unity." Like them, Cabanis saw the world as a kind of nest of
spontaneous, ubiquitous activity. Under certain conditions of organization, brute
matter is transformed into living substance which is able to experience conscious or
unconscious sensation. Matter possesses its own internal and spontaneous activity,
which Cabanis attributed to a single universal force that is variously manifest in
different forms of organization. It ranges from simple gravitation, to "electrical
affinities", to "instinct of plants", and finally, to the complex nervous sensibility of
animals.54 The latter, he believed cannot be explained in terms of physical and
chemical hypotheses but only in terms of the living body itself. One is reminded here
of Barthez' hierarchy of natural motive forces ranging from attraction through to the
forces ofthe vital principle.
Like all good scientific men by then, Cabanis ignored the question offirst causes or
"essences" in nature. He did not even refer to the soul as an intellectual principle. Nor
did he make any reference to a creator God who transcended his creation. He is more
accurately described as a pantheist or a deist than an atheist, for he believed that the
"Gusdorf, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 180-212.
52 Cabanis, op. cit., note42 above, vol. 1, pp. 77-133.
" Ibid., pp. 263-293.
14 See Martin S. Staum, Medical components of Cabanis' science ofman, Princton University Press,
1981. Staum discusses Cabanis' debt to the animists and vitalists. He objects to the "materialist" label
traditionally applied to Cabanis, who was by no means a mechanist reductionist. His phraseology
resembled that ofnotorious atheists like d'Holbach and La Mettrie, says Staum, but he was very interested
in the question ofvital properties and human intelligence. See also Paul Delauney, 'L'evolution philosophi-
que et m6dicale de biomechanicisme de Descartes a Boerhaave, de Leibniz a Cabanis', LeprogresmMdicale,
1927, 20: 1289-1384; and Owsei Temkin, 'The philosophical background of Magendie's physiology', Bull.
Hist. Med., 1946, 20: 10-35.
82Medicineandideology
world is inhabited by an intelligent and providential will." The human mind was pre-
sumed to participate in.this universal intelligence. Such a monist notion wedded to the
sensationalist belief that the development of a system of morals is based solely on
responses to pleasure and to pain make reference to a deity unnecessary, at least for
scientific purposes.
One of the clearest examples of the specific application of an analytic method to a
medical question is the work on pathological classification done by Philippe Pinel
(1745-1827), who exerted a major influence on Bichat. Pinel received a medical degree
from Toulouse in 1773 before going to Montpellier. In 1777, being too poor to hire
transport, he walked to Paris. There, he became a friend of Lavoisier and so came
under the general influence ofthe ideologues. He began to study Locke and Condillac.
Cabanis introduced him to the salon of Madame Helvetius. In 1792, on the recom-
mendation ofthe Hospital Commission on which Cabanis sat, the painfully shy Pinel
was appointed to take charge of the insane patients at the Hopital Generale,
established in 1656 to clear Paris ofbeggars. Its two major divisions were the Bicetre,
which confined males, and the Saltpetriere, which was primarily for women. His much
publicized move of releasing the patients, veritable prisoners, from their chains is
reported to have saved his life on one occasion, when rumours that doctors were
poisoning wells led to Pinel's seizure by a mob. He was rescued by a member of the
French Guards, a former inmate who had been unchained.
As a habitue' ofthe ideologues' groups, Pinel imbibed thearguments concerning the
need to develop an autonomous science of medicine. It was assumed that the reform
would include development of a rational and systematic nosology, or classification
and description of disease. Vicq d'Azyr and other members of the Societe Royale de
Medecine had emphasized the need for such. As ifto fill the need, Pinel's Nosographie
philosophique appeared in 1798.5' To do the work, he methodically applied the
analytic method to decompose complex pathological states with a view to isolating the
elements common to specific morbid phenomena. Mere observation of illness would
not have been sufficient. According to Pinel, such classifications as those ofSauvages
and William Cullen were too laborious, relying overmuch on such systems as Lin-
naeus' botanical classification. They failed to sort out the fundamental symptoms ofa
disease from its multitude of individual variations. Because there was frequent confu-
sion between basic and secondary affections, there was an excessive and confusing
multiplication of symptoms and illnesses. Pinel asumed that an illness was a sort of
entity with a certain degree of regularity, a constancy of cause, effect, and conse-
quences. By means of analysis, he intended to sort out and to isolate essential com-
ponent parts ofa disease from accidental individual symptoms."7
In a section on 'Method', Pinel advised the nosographer and the physician that the
first step in studying an illness is to note the age and constitution of the individual, to
retrace the disease's symptoms and to note the pulse, temperature, respiration, diges-
15 See Cazeneuve, loc. cit., note 47 above, pp. xxxv-xxxvii.
"Pinel's Nosographiephilosophique and its relationship to earlier classification systems and to ideology
are discussed by Moravia, op. cit., note 2 above.
17 Philippe Pinel, 'Introduction', Nosographie philosophique ou la methode de l'analyse appliquee a la
medecine, 2 vols., Paris, Richard, Cailleet Ravier, 1798, vol. 1, pp. iv-xxxix.
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tion, intellectual faculties, and excretions. One must not ignore such extenuating
circumstances as fatigue, moral affections, abuse of pleasure, unhealthy air, con-
tagious principles, and so on. Symptoms must be examined "independently of all
hypotheses and only in terms ofimpressions made in the sensory organs." The second
step requires the observer to separate individual variations of an illness from its
specific characteristics. Finally, one must consider particular affections in relation to
age, sex, manner ofliving, and habits which might modify the progress ofan illness.58
Pinel divided disease into six classes: fevers, inflammations (phlegmasies), active
haemorrhaging, nervous diseases, lymphatic affections, and "others". These were
subdivided into orders, genera, and finally, a multitude of species. He consciously
applied Condillac's method throughout. "It is necessary in the exposition as in the
research for truth", he wrote "to begin with the most simple ideas and the ones which
come immediately from the senses and then to move by degree to the most complex
ideas."
Pinel arrived at six categories of fevers, which seemed to him to embrace all the
known types: angiotenic fevers are characterized by an irritation of blood vessels;
meningogastric fevers have their seat in the stomach membranes or in the membrane
of the duodenum; adenomeningeal fevers shown an irritation ofmucous membranes;
adynamic fevers involve atony of muscle fibres; ataxic fevers follow a physical or
moral shock to the nerves and finally, adenonervous fevers involve a contagious
principle that affects nerves and glands.59
Inflammation, the second class of illness, includes a variety ofcontagious diseases.
Ophthalmia, tonsillitis, various sorts of sore throat, and numerous catarrhs are all
inflammations of mucous membranes; encephalitis, pleurisy, and peritonitis are
inflammations of diaphanous membranes; "phlegmon", hepatitis, nephritis, and
peripneumonia are irritations ofcellular tissue glands, and the visceralparenchyma;
rheumatism and gout are of the order of muscle inflammations; and finally, malig-
nant pustules, skin inflammations, smallpox, measles, and scarlet fever are part ofthe
order of cutaneous inflammations.60 And so on with the remaining four classes of
illness.
I list these categories only to make the point that in each case, the affected part was
taken to be a particular fibre or member rather than a particular organ. Angiotenic
fever, for example, does not attack the whole blood vessel but rather its tunic; inflam-
mations are located in particular membranes rather than in the lungs, stomach, or
other organs. It was an important innovation in pathological classification. It was also
a catalyst for Bichat, leading him to differentiate the various membranes of the
animal anatomy and to study their distribution and properties. In what was rather an
uncharacteristic gesture for him, Bichat acknowledged Pinel to be the source of his
ideas in the Traite des membranes, justifiably hastening to add that many of the
58 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 374-380; see also the 2nd ed., 3 vols., Paris, J. A. Brosson, 1803, vol. 3, pp. 523-530,
where discussion is more extensive.
"' Ibid., Ist ed., vol. 1, pp. 1-129, and 2nd ed., vol. 1, aredevoted to a discussion of'Fivres'.
60 Ibid., Ist ed., vol. 1, pp. 130-240, and 2nd ed., vol. 2, pp. 1-450, are devoted to a discussion of
'Phlegmasies' or inflammation.
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specific results were entirely his own."
Pinel, in turn, was quick to appreciate the importance of Bichat's theoretical
innovation. In the second edition ofthe Nosographie in 1802, he commended Bichat's
work calling it a most scrupulous and attentive examination ofthe subject.62 By then,
ofcourse, theAnatomiegenerale had superseded the Traitedes membranes. Although
Pinel's first and second editions are the same for the most part, it is clear that his
thoughts concerning his classification were affected by what Bichat had written. The
implications of his own classification were thereby enhanced. Pinel wrote the follow-
ingin 1802:
The general view ofall the theories ofinflammation regard this term as unequivocal and as representing
the same series of symptoms in all cases; whereas it may be taken with different senses depending upon
whether it is located in the tegumens, the cellular tissue, the viscera, serous membranes, the articulation
or the mucous membranes. But in these parts, so different amongst themselves, when one compares them
for tissue, structure, sensibility and organic functions, do they not still have a common conformity in the
lesions which they experience due to an irritating cause; and cannot one observe there the development,
although in different degrees and in various proportions, the heat, the redness, the tension and the
discomfort whose ensemble is indicated by the abstract terms inflammation?
The statement, which is not present in the first edition, indicates that Pinel had a fairly
substantial involvement with the theory and the methods that Bichat used to study the
tissues. Pinel wrote that he intended to combine the views ofHaller, Bichat, and other
modern physiologists to throw new light on the true character and the seat of
cutaneous inflammations. He described the particularly effective method of isolating
the epidermis by maceration. One can only detach the epidermis of a cadaver, he
wrote, by means of putrefaction, maceration, or boiling.63 This was precisely the sort
of method which Bichat reported using to distinguish between membranes and then,
subsequently, all the twenty-one tissues into which hedivided thebodily parts.
The ideologues' range of interests was wide enough, as we have seen, to include all
the natural sciences as well as man's political and social environment. During the
"Xavier Bichat, 'Dissertation sur les membranes, et sur leurs rapports generaux d'organisation',
Memoires de laSociete Medicaled'Emulation, 1798, 2: 371-385; and Xavier Bichat, Trait des membranes
en general et de diverses membranes enparticulier, Paris, Richard, Caille et Ravier, 1800, pp. 3-5. An ins-
tructive and interesting insight into Pinel's classification, and especially of its relationship with that of
Bichat, is provided by Foucault, op. cit., note 27 above, esp. pp. 174-194. He makes the point that there is a
great gulf between their two methods, for with Bichat, disease was no longer a particular entity but a
complex movement oftissues in reaction to an irritating cause. For Pinel, fever was essential. For Bichat, it
is a local irritation, an increase in the flow ofblood accompanied by circulation.
62 Pinel, op. cit., note 58 above, 2nd ed., vol. 1, pp. i-lvi, esp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
63 Ibid., pp. 17-19. The connexion between Pinel's and Bichat's clas'sification is even more clearly stated
in a quotation in the 5th ed. of Nosographie philosophique, which is quoted by Pedro Lain Entralgo,
'Sensualism and vitalism in Bichat's "Anatomie G6nerale" ', J. Hist. Med., 1948, 3: 57-58: "The inflam-
matory state has, in fact, properties in common whatever the part attacked may be, and these points of
contact are more considerable in proportion to the closeness of the analogy of the tissues and the organic
functions of the parts affected; but again, how great is the diversity, if the organization of these parts is
different! The phlegmasies have thus been divided into different orders, according as they are found in the
integuments, in the mucous membranes, serous, fibrous, in the glands, or in the muscles. What does it
matter that the arachnoid membrane, the pleura and the peritoneum are situated in the different parts ofthe
human body, ifthese membranes possess general conformities in their structure?" With this quotation, Lain
Entralgo implied that Pinel had a distinctly articulated tissue theory before Bichat published his work on
membranes and tissues. Unfortunately, this statement is not present in the first oreven the second edition of
Nosographie philosophique. I believe that it reinforces the point that Bichat and Pinel mutually profited
from each other's ideas.
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eighteenth century, what were considered to be Newtonian scientific principles had
been extended by a variety of enthusiasts to embrace the study of the human mind,
society, and even theology. The ideologues had a hand in such developments. Because
Napoleon suppressed the ideologues' teachings, however, the influence of
sensationalism and analysis in the nineteenth century was only indirect. Certain
deeply rooted notions concerning the nature of scientific investigation necessarily
became implicit and thus remained part of the stock-in-trade of the scientific com-
munity. Temkin has shown, for example, that Franqois Magendie was firmly rooted in
the sensationalist tradition and in the vitalist assumptions that accompanied it.64
Furthermore, the social sciences took form in the last century, building upon earlier
foundations. Thanks at least partly to the preoccupations ofthe ideologues, sociology,
political science, and above all psychology now had a rationale for their status as
"sciences". This ostensibly put them on a par with physics, chemistry, and physiology.
The names of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and Cabanis, however, largely vanished
from the literature ofintellectual history only to be restored in recent years.
We shall see in the next three chapters that sensationalist assumptions played a
major role in Bichat's work. He belonged to the ideologues at least peripherally.
Without being particularly careful to relate his ideas to those of anyone other than
Pinel, Bichat described learning as a process ofacquiring and relating sensations. The
very idea of two lives upon which the arguments of La vie et la mort rested was
possible only if one accepted such an epistemology. His much-lauded Anatomie
generale is a classic example of a deliberate application of the method of analysis.
Bichat decomposed the complex body parts and organs so as to isolate and to study
the simple tissues composing them, and only his untimely death interrupted the
recomposition he was undertaking in theAnatomiedescriptive.
"Temkin, op. cit., note 54 above, pp. 20-35.
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